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DOES THE DSM-5 THREATEN AUTISM SERVICE ACCESS? 
 
Rebecca Johnson* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) provides a 
classification of mental disorders.1 Its categories outline criteria that a patient must 
satisfy in order to receive a diagnosis such as autism or major depression.2 Changes 
to DSM, made in the most recent edition of the DSM, DSM-5, have begun to receive 
significant scrutiny, because the wording of the criteria, the number of criteria a 
patient must satisfy, and other aspects of DSM guidelines affect who can qualify for 
a DSM diagnosis and as a result, what sort of medical and social services they may 
receive. 
On January 19, 2012, the New York Times announced that the new definition 
of autism, scheduled for release the following year in the DSM-5, would exclude 
many children who had previously received a diagnosis.3 The article covered a 
study, presented at a meeting of the Icelandic Medical Association, which predicted 
that the new DSM-5 criteria would only include 60% of the persons who qualified 
for an autism diagnosis under DSM-IV. As proposed, DSM-5 sought to collapse 
three disorders—autism, Asperger’s, and pervasive developmental disorder-not 
otherwise specified—into a single autism category.4 The study and its New York 
Times coverage sparked a wave of headlines about how the DSM changes would 
endanger service access for persons with autism and Asperger’s. ABC News 
announced that a “[n]ew autism definition could exclude many,” and emphasized 
that “if patients lose their diagnosis status, they might not be able to get the 
treatments and services provided for autistic patients and their families, which often 
require a diagnosis to qualify for insurance coverage, special education and other 
assistance.”5 Reuter’s Health declared that, “[w]ith autism’s definition set to change, 
                                                     
* © 2015 Rebecca Johnson. Rebecca Johnson is a Medical Sociology Ph.D. candidate 
at Princeton University and presented at the November 7, 2014, Utah Law Review 
Symposium, Legal Borders and Mental Disorders: The Challenge of Defining Mental Illness.  
1 About DSM-5, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/Default 
.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/97PD-REKX (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
2 See id. 
3 Benedict Carey, New Definition of Autism Will Exclude Many, Study Suggests, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/health/research/new-autism-
definition-would-exclude-many-study-suggests.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2WSM-
B536. 
4 James C. McPartland et al., Sensitivity and Specificity of Proposed DSM-5 Diagnostic 
Criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorder, 51 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 
368, 368–69 (2012). 
5 Carrie Gann, New Autism Definition Could Exclude Many, ABC NEWS (Jan. 20, 2012, 
2:54 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/health/2012/01/20/new-autism-definition-could-
exclude-many/, archived at https://perma.cc/35QP-TZ2K. 
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Asperger’s patients could lose services,” and described the “consternation” that 
affected families were feeling as a result of the DSM changes.6  
The media largely claimed that the DSM-5 revisions would endanger access to 
autism services. Yet despite the wide-ranging media attention given to the issue, 
there has been little scholarly research exploring the link between the changes to 
autism in the DSM-5 and access to autism-related services. Most existing research 
on the impact of the DSM changes has focused on how the changes may impact a 
child or adolescent’s access to a diagnosis rather than on how the changes might 
impact access to the entitlements associated with a diagnosis.7 Yet the connection 
between access to a DSM diagnosis and access to related services is far from 
automatic. For instance, having a diagnosis of autism may help a child access special 
education services under the disability category of autism. But, before this takes 
place, a separate team must decide that the impairment impedes educational 
functioning in addition to medical functioning. Only then can the child’s parents 
work with the school district to formulate an Individualized Education Plan (IEP). 
Even then, the final plans may still differ significantly between children with the 
same DSM diagnosis.8 
This highlights that the strength of the link between DSM categories and 
various types of medical, educational, and financial entitlements varies based on 
how closely the entitlement is coupled with the DSM diagnosis. In this context, 
                                                     
6 Julie Steenhuysen, With Autism’s Definition Set to Change, Asperger’s Patients Could 
Lose Services, LOVELAND REPORTER-HERALD (Dec. 21, 2012, 11:30 AM), 
http://www.reporterherald.com/ci_22239759/autisms-definition-set-change-aspergers-
patients-could-lose, archived at http://perma.cc/N3AM-5SY6. 
7  For example, McPartland et al. found that “[g]iven changes to actual symptom 
descriptions and to the constellation and quantity of symptoms required for diagnosis, it is 
possible that the autism spectrum would represent a different population of individuals.” 
McPartland et al., supra note 4, at 370. But see Roy Grant & Molly Nozyce, Proposed 
Changes to the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic Criteria for Autism Spectrum 
Disorder: Implications for Young Children and Their Families, 17 MATERNAL & CHILD 
HEALTH J. 586, 586–87 (2013), for a discussion of the potential impacts of DSM changes on 
service entitlements. Grant and Nozyce focus on the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act (IDEA) eligibility alone, rather than the combination of IDEA eligibility, private 
insurance mandates, and changes made by the Affordable Care Act to mandated autism 
benefits. See id. Grant and Nozyce’s description is primarily a qualitative discussion of the 
changes’ impact, rather than a quantitative analysis of what proportion of children with 
autism are likely to be affected by certain changes to medical and educational benefits. See 
id. 
8 See generally Mitchell L. Yell et al., Developing Legally Correct and Educationally 
Appropriate Programs for Students with Autism Spectrum Disorders, 18 FOCUS ON AUTISM 
& OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, 182, 185 (2003) (finding that individualized IEPs 
must “contain measurable annual goals and a description of the methods by which a student’s 
progress toward his or her goals are measured. . . . [And] IEP teams must regularly inform 
parents of students in special education of their child’s progress toward his or her annual 
goals and the extent to which this progress is sufficient to enable the child to achieve these 
goals”). 
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coupling refers to the number of steps and interpretations that stand between the 
diagnosis and access to the entitlement. Tightly coupled diagnosis-entitlement pairs 
include insurance coverage of medical treatment, where the diagnosis almost always 
results in eligibility for treatments provided by certified practitioners.9  Loosely 
coupled diagnosis-entitlement pairs are mainly related to educational benefits, where 
a diagnosis helps a child qualify for special education services, but many other 
factors play a role in determining eligibility, including: whether the child’s 
impairment is deemed educational; which services are covered in his individualized 
education plan (IEP); and then how closely the IEP is followed once decided upon.10 
This shows that while the media depicts a straightforward link between access to a 
diagnosis and access to medical and educational entitlements, the reality is often 
much different. It is important to investigate the factors that determine how DSM 
diagnosis translates into service access.  
Drawing a focus to the factors between an individual’s DSM diagnosis and 
their later access to entitlements, this Article addresses a single question: will the 
DSM-5 changes endanger services for persons with autism or Asperger’s? To 
ground this question in concrete policy illustrations, the Article focuses on the 
impact of DSM-5 changes on two DSM-linked entitlements: state mandated autism 
insurance benefits and special education benefits. Of note, the Article finds that 
criteria for who can access DSM entitlements varies between states, and thus raises 
questions about how the DSM changes impact not only general access to autism 
services among U.S. children and adolescents, but also how the DSM changes are 
impacted by state variations in access to these services.  
Part I addresses the case’s broader relevance to understanding DSM-linked 
entitlements. First, this Part considers a focus on autism spectrum disorders. Second, 
this Part considers a focus on DSM-linked entitlements that vary between states as 
opposed to entitlements where DSM changes affect all states in a more uniform 
manner. After discussing this disease case study and focusing on state-by-state 
variations, Part II argues that in order to understand the impact of DSM-5 changes, 
we need to understand the entitlement landscape for autism in the years prior to 
                                                     
9 See Lucy A. Bilaver & Neil Jordan, Impact of State Mental Health Parity Laws on 
Access to Autism Services, 64 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 967, 967–69 (2013). Bilaver and 
Jordan examine state mental health parity laws with respect to autism, finding that seventeen 
states have “strict parity laws” (indicating that the law requires fairly similar mental and 
physical illness coverage) that either explicitly or implicitly include autism and many states 
that either lacked strict parity legislation or were unclear about whether autism was covered. 
Id. Their analysis suggests that many states have strong protections for medical insurance 
coverage for autism. See id. at 967. In addition to state mental health parity laws that may 
explicitly mention autism, the 2008 federal mental health parity legislation instructs insurers 
to define “mental health conditions” eligible for coverage to “be consistent with generally 
recognized independent standards of current medical practice for example, the most current 
version of the . . . DSM.” Parity in Mental Health and Substance Use Disorder Benefits, 29 
C.F.R. 2590.712(a) (2014).  
10 See generally Yell et al., supra note 8, at 184 (discussing education performance and 
IEPS). 
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DSM-5’s publication in 2013. Therefore, Part II outlines the policy landscape of 
insurance and educational entitlements for autism in the years preceding the DSM-
5. Drawing on novel empirical analysis, this Part shows the importance of viewing 
these two types of entitlements as interactive complements rather than siloed 
services by illustrating how more generous insurance coverage for autism services 
leads to more rapid uptake of special education autism services. Understanding this 
interplay is important because it highlights two routes through which DSM changes 
can impact policy. The first is a direct route where a DSM change impacts a policy 
like insurance coverage that is explicitly tied to a DSM diagnosis. The second is an 
indirect route where a DSM change influences a policy like insurance coverage, 
which then impacts how many children seek special education treatment for autism. 
After Part II’s analysis of the pre-DSM-5 policy landscape, Part III turns to the 
question: what impact might the DSM-5 changes have on services surrounding 
autism policy? Contrary to common fears that DSM changes would significantly 
endanger service access, this Part finds that the DSM-5 changes will also have some 
benefits for autism service access that have been overlooked. Concluding, the 
Article discusses the implications of the case for broader understandings of the 
various degrees of coupling between DSM diagnoses and service entitlements.  
 
I.  AUTISM AS AN ENTITLEMENTS CASE STUDY 
 
To understand the strength of coupling between DSM diagnoses and service 
entitlements, it is important to focus on an identifiable disease case study and 
specific entitlements associated with that disease. This Part will use autism as a case 
study. But why focus on autism?  
 
A.  Why Study Autism? 
 
Autism is an important case because the condition has sparked a cascade of 
changes to the landscape of medical and educational entitlements. The first step in 
the cascade was the sharp increase in autism’s identified prevalence. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, when autism’s prevalence was not systematically tracked and when 
researchers relied on methods such as surveys of doctors and parents to detect 
prevalence, the prevalence of autism was estimated at 20 per 10,000 children.11 
Since then, as organizations like the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) have started 
                                                     
11 See generally Lorna Wing & Judith Gould, Severe Impairments of Social Interaction 
and Associated Abnormalities in Children: Epidemiology and Classification, 9 J. AUTISM & 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 11, 24 (1979) (finding “[i]mpairments of reciprocal social 
interaction . . . in 21.2 of every 10,000 children aged under 15 in the area studied, of whom 
4.9 had a history of typical autism”). For a discussion of how this study is used to inform the 
20 per 10,000 children prevalence rate, see Lorna Wing & David Potter, The Epidemiology 
of Autistic Spectrum Disorders: Is the Prevalence Rising?, 8 MENTAL RETARDATION & 
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REVS. 151, 159 (2002) (noting that this study showed 
that the “age specific prevalence for all autistic spectrum disorders . . . was 20 per 10,000 
children aged under 15 years”). 
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to measure prevalence in a more systematic way, the documented prevalence has 
risen from 1 in 150 eight-year-old children in 2002, to 1 in 110 in 2006, to 1 in 88 
in 2008, and finally to 1 in 68 in 2010.12 Though there is much debate about whether 
the rise in prevalence reflects a change in the real incidence of autism, or whether 
the main contributor is increased awareness around the diagnosis and other social 
contagion processes, 13  the increase in prevalence has set a cascade of policy 
developments in motion, regardless of the increase’s cause.  
The second link in the autism policy cascade is that treatments developed to 
improve the functioning of children with autism are expensive, which, when 
combined with the high prevalence of autism, creates large cost pressures for many 
industries and for society as a whole. For instance, a group of therapies under the 
heading of Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) are considered the most effective 
treatment for autism, yet can cost up to $100,000 per year.14 And since behavioral 
                                                     
12  Facts About ASD, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/facts.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TLW5-YAF5 
(last updated Feb. 24, 2015). 
13 See, e.g., GIL EYAL ET AL., THE AUTISM MATRIX 257 (2010) (“Our main point [is] 
that the recent rise in autism diagnoses represents not an epidemic, but a change in the 
institutional conditions under which we perceive and treat childhood disorders.”); Eric 
Fombonne, The Prevalence of Autism, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 87, 87 (2003) (“[T]he authors 
suggest that these differences might reflect new diagnostic criteria for autism and increased 
availability of developmental disability services for children with autism in the 1990s.”); 
Marissa King & Peter Bearman, Diagnostic Change and the Increased Prevalence of Autism, 
38 INT. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1224, 1224 (2009) (“The objective of this study [is] to determine 
the extent to which the increased prevalence of autism in California has been driven by 
changes in diagnostic practices, diagnostic substitution and diagnostic accretion.”); Ka-Yuet 
Liu et al., Social Influence and the Autism Epidemic, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1387, 1387 (2010) 
(“We eliminate competing explanations . . . and show that information diffusion 
simultaneously contributed to the increased prevalence, spatial clustering, and decreasing 
age of diagnosis.”); David Mandell & Luc Lecavalier, Should We Believe the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention’s Autism Spectrum Disorder Prevalence Estimates?, 18 
AUTISM 482, 483 (2014) (“[L]ocal policies, resources and awareness may drive observed 
differences in prevalence.”); Craig J. Newschaffer et al., The Epidemiology of Autism 
Spectrum Disorders, 28 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 235, 239 (2007) (“[T]he question of 
whether this historical increase can be fully accounted for by these and other changes in 
diagnosis and classification remains open to debate . . . .”). 
14 For a discussion of effectiveness, see generally Laurie A. Vismara & Sally J. Rogers, 
Behavioral Treatments in Autism Spectrum Disorder: What Do We Know?, 6 ANN. REV. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 447, 447 (2010) (“[I]intervention programs applying the scientific 
teaching principles of applied behavior analysis (ABA) have been identified as the treatment 
of choice.”). For a discussion of the cost of ABA, see generally Thomas Zane et al., The Cost 
of Fad Treatments in Autism, 5 J. EARLY & INTENSIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTION 44, 44 (2008) 
(“Two . . . fad treatments, Sensory Integration Therapy and Relationship Development 
Intervention are discussed in terms of data on effectiveness and cost of treatment.”). See also 
James N. Bouder et al., Brief Report: Quantifying the Impact of Autism Coverage on Private 
Insurance Premiums, 39 J. AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 953, 953 (2009) (“Using 
Pennsylvania legislation as an example, which proposed covering services up to $36,000 per 
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treatments straddle the line between medical and non-medical interventions, the 
treatments could fall into any one of the service sectors that provide treatment for 
autism, including: healthcare; special education; housing; or other social services for 
adults.15 The cost of treatment has raised questions about which social institutions 
are responsible for paying. Insurers argue that behavioral treatments are educational 
interventions that ought to be covered within school special education budgets, 
while, in contrast, schools argue as long as they provide evidence-based 
interventions that lead to meaningful educational benefits, they do not need to cover 
intensive behavioral treatments. 16  In sum, autism’s status as a developmental 
disorder that creates problems with both school and outside-of-school functioning 
leads to significant debates about not only whether children with the disorder should 
receive entitlements but also about which institutional sector should provide the bulk 
of these entitlements.  
This conflict over which institutions should help pay for autism treatments has 
led to policy developments that make autism an interesting case study for analyzing 
links between DSM diagnoses and service entitlements. Autism advocacy groups 
such as Autism Speaks have become frustrated with private insurance companies 
rejecting coverage for intensive behavioral interventions such as ABA 17 As Autism 
Votes, the legislative action arm of Autism Speaks has stated: “many insurance 
companies continue to refuse coverage for [ABA], which is considered the standard 
of care for autism treatment, on the basis that it is ‘experimental’ or ‘educational.’”18 
To remedy this refusal, Autism Speaks is lobbying state legislatures to pass autism 
insurance mandates that require private insurers to cover autism treatments.19 Figure 
                                                     
year for individuals less than 21 years of age, this paper estimates potential premium 
increases.”). 
15 See generally Ariane V.S. Buescher et al., Costs of Autism Spectrum Disorders in the 
United Kingdom and the United States, 168 J. AM. MED. ASS’N PEDIATRICS 721, 721 (2014) 
(“The distribution of economic effect across many different service systems raises questions 
about coordination of services and sectors.”). 
16 See Catherine Nelson & Dixie Snow Huefner, Young Children with Autism: Judicial 
Responses to the Lovaas and Discrete Trial Training Debates, 26 J. EARLY INTERVENTION 
1 (2003), for a review of litigation between parents and school districts about coverage of 
ABA and related therapies, such as the Lovaas method and TEACCH model. In reviewing 
the case outcomes, the Article notes that courts have usually deferred to the school districts 
but “required justification of IEP-based teaching methods as data based and calculated to 
address the individual needs of a child with autism.” Id. at 16. Many cases have centered on 
the definition established in Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson School District v. 
Rowley, which requires that IEPs provide meaningful benefit to a child, but does not obligate 
school districts to “maximize” a child’s educational benefits. See 458 U.S. 176, 198–200 
(1982). Many parents argue that intensive behavioral treatments are necessary to provide the 
child with a meaningful benefit. 
17 See State Initiatives, AUTISM SPEAKS, http://www.autismspeaks.org/state-initiatives, 
archived at http://perma.cc/48S7-WDMA (last visited Mar. 21, 2015). 
18 Id. 
19 See generally Rebecca A. Johnson et al., US State Variation in Autism Insurance 
Mandates: Balancing Access and Fairness, 18 AUTISM 803, 803–814 (2014) (exploring as a 
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1 outlines the passage of mandates by year up to October 2014. The passage of these 
mandates increases the importance of changes to the DSM category of autism. As 
shown later, all of the enacted mandates specify that a child must have a diagnosis 
of an autism spectrum disorder to qualify for the mandated treatment.20 This makes 
autism an important case study for studying entitlements that are explicitly linked to 
a specific DSM diagnosis. 
 
Figure 1. Mandate Passage by Year21 
 
  
 
                                                     
case study “the fact that only 30 out of 51 US states or territories passed mandates requiring 
private insurers to offer extensive coverage of autism behavioral therapies, creating variation 
for privately insured children living in different US states”); Susan Parish et al., State 
Insurance Parity Legislation for Autism Services and Family Financial Burden, 50 INTELL. 
& DEVEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 190, 190–98 (2012) (examining “the association 
between states’ legislative mandates that private insurance cover autism services and the 
health care–related financial burden reported by families of children with autism”); AUTISM 
SPEAKS, supra note 17 (“Autism Speaks is working to change state insurance laws to require 
private health insurance policies to cover the diagnosis and treatment of autism spectrum 
disorders.”). 
20 See infra Part III.A.1. 
21 This figure was created by the author with data from the following sources and was 
corroborated by checking the specified states’ legislative codes: Insurance Coverage for 
Autism, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 2012), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/autism-and-insurance-coverage-state-laws.aspx, 
archived at http://perma.cc/FCL4-BL5H; AUTISM SPEAKS, supra note 17; infra Table 3. 
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B.  Why Study Between-Sate Variation? 
 
As argued earlier, rather than assuming that changes to the DSM category of 
autism have a straightforward impact on service access, we should understand the 
factors that connect DSM changes and the access to services. Also, the autism case 
study reveals an important mediating factor: variation between states in autism-
related policies. Accordingly, Parts II and III outline two sources of state-by-state 
variation that affect service access. First, states vary based on whether the state has 
passed a private insurance mandate for autism treatments and whether the mandated 
autism benefits were codified into the state’s Essential Health Benefits (EHBs) 
through its choice of a benchmark plan under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (ACA). Second, states vary in the ways they define eligibility for the 
special education category of autism. Before reviewing that policy landscape, it is 
worth exploring why state-by-state variation is important for those seeking to 
understand the link between DSM diagnoses and service entitlements.  
First, is the obvious fact that state-by-state variation means that children who 
have the same DSM diagnosis but who live in different states are likely to receive 
different depths of services. This variation seems to require ethical justification, 
especially because, as Figure 1 illustrates, private insurance mandates do not seem 
to fall along clear liberal-conservative lines that might reflect ideological differences 
about the proper role of government in regulating healthcare. 22  Likewise, the 
differences in special education categories for autism do not fall along clear 
ideological lines.23 DSM changes affect the entire United States, but since these 
changes are mediated by state-level variation in DSM-associated entitlements, it is 
worth exploring how the DSM changes might have an uneven impact across states. 
The second factor that makes state-by-state variation interesting is that it gives us 
insight into what features of a state’s laws and policy lead to variation in the impact 
that DSM changes have. Why have some states adopted autism-specific insurance 
benefits, thus magnifying the impact of any DSM changes and making those changes 
more politically controversial among the advocacy community, while other states 
have not passed policies singling out autism benefits? Advocacy organizations, like 
the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI), focus on a broad range of mental 
illnesses, and thus attenuate the impact of any one DSM change. In contrast, a 
movement has emerged around one specific DSM diagnosis, autism, making any 
change to the autism category especially threatening to state-by-state legislation that 
singles out the autism category.  
 
                                                     
22 See Johnson et al., supra note 19, at 808 (finding a link between three ethical 
acceptabe sources of variation for characteristics of a state’s autism insurance coverage). 
23 See Jaclyn R. MacFarlane & Tomoe Kanaya, What Does it Mean to be Autistic? 
Inter-state Variation in Special Education Criteria for Autism Services, 18 J. CHILD & FAM. 
STUD. 662, 662–69 (2009), for documentation that there is state-by-state variation in special 
education autism criteria, though they do not investigate what features of a state might 
contribute to the variation. Further, MacFarlane and Kanaya’s analysis does not argue that 
there are political or ideological reasons behind the different definitions. Id. 
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II.  PRE DSM-5 LANDSCAPE OF INSURANCE AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
 
Part I outlined the features of autism that make it an important case study for 
the different degrees of coupling between DSM categories and service entitlements. 
These include debates over whether school districts or insurers are primarily 
responsible for funding these entitlements. Two additional changes are taking place 
within autism treatment. Successful state-level political mobilization is pressing 
private insurers to cover autism treatments, and the resulting mobilization is creating 
state-by-state variation in insurance and educational benefits. These features 
contribute to a complex U.S. autism service landscape, with advocates’ legislative 
victories creating instability over time and variation between states’ autism services. 
Therefore, before analyzing the impact of the DSM-5 changes in Part III, this section 
will focus on two specific DSM-associated entitlements that emerged in the decade 
leading up to the DSM-5 revisions: state-level autism-specific private insurance 
mandates and special education benefits for autism. 
In outlining this policy landscape, it will be argued that rather than examining 
each entitlement in isolation, we should examine the way that changes to one 
entitlement impact the other entitlement.24 Examining the interdependence of these 
two entitlements is important because it can help illustrate the multiple routes by 
which DSM changes impact service access. One route is by impacting the 
entitlement itself—for instance, a DSM change that expands a category by relaxing 
the criteria a potential patient needs to meet will allow more persons to receive a 
diagnosis and qualify for insurance coverage of associated treatment. Another route 
through which DSM changes can affect service access is by impacting access to one 
service that then impacts access to another entitlement. For example, increased use 
of reimbursed medical services for autism is helping children and families 
successfully argue for the inclusion of certain services in a child’s special education 
IEP. Since others have examined the first route—DSM’s impact on entitlements in 
isolation25—my focus in this Article is on the second route: the DSM’s impact on 
two sets of entitlements (medical and educational) given their interdependence. To 
explore this second route, we need to understand the interdependence between 
insurance and educational benefits for autism. 
To do so, this section first asks, what historical factors led advocacy groups to 
press for disease-specific mandates? This question is important in understanding 
why advocacy groups focused on disease-specific mandates even after broader 
mental health parity legislation was passed. After reviewing the general reasons for 
why autism groups have pressed for mandates, the section will analyze why some 
                                                     
24 For instance, many articles focus on either autism insurance benefits or special 
education services, without looking at the interplay between the two policies and how the 
DSM-5 might affect both. For an example of the former, see Parish et al., supra note 19, at 
190. For an example of the latter, see Grant and Nozyce, supra note 7, at 586–87. For an 
article that discusses the interplay between medical and educational policies, but that fails to 
discuss the potential impact of DSM-5 changes, see generally Buescher et al., supra note 15, 
at 721–22. 
25 See, e.g., Grant & Nozyce, supra note 7, at 587. 
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states have passed mandates while others have not, which can help us understand 
features of a state that make it more likely to create entitlements with a close link to 
a DSM category. After understanding why the mandates are passed, the section then 
turns to what effect the mandates have had, and more specifically, what impact the 
passage of private insurance mandates has had on autism’s special education 
entitlement landscape. In particular, autism advocates framed the mandates as a way 
to shift some of the costs of autism from publicly financed special education to 
private insurance. For instance, upon New York’s passage of an autism insurance 
mandate, the President of Autism Speaks commented that the legislation would not 
only help relieve families of some of the costs of autism services, but would also 
relieve a portion of the taxpayers financing burden. The President stated: “This 
critical legislation will . . . save the taxpayers of this state an estimated $13 million 
in special education, Medicaid and social service costs in the next six years.”26 
Therefore, it is worth examining the extent to which mandated insurance coverage 
for autism and special education services under the autism category substitute for 
one another, with more generous private insurance coverage reducing pressure on 
special education service utilization, or whether the two seem to rise in tandem, with 
more generous private insurance coverage increasing rather than decreasing demand 
for autism special education services. Examining the relationship between these two 
entitlements can help explain how DSM changes influence an interdependent web 
of services rather than individual isolated services. And since families draw upon 
both medical and educational services to meet their treatment needs,27 taking this 
interdependent perspective is a more accurate way of understanding the impact of 
DSM revisions on service access. 
 
A.  Insurance Benefits 
 
1.  Historical Factors Behind the Mandates’ Passage 
 
The decade leading up to the DSM-5 revisions featured two important policy 
developments that shaped the autism service landscape. The first was increasing 
levels of insurance parity between mental and physical illnesses.28 When health 
insurance was first introduced in the 1930s, few private insurers covered 
hospitalization for mental illness, since psychiatric care had been traditionally 
                                                     
26 Rick Karlin, Autism Coverage Bill is Law, CAPITOL CONFIDENTIAL (Nov. 1, 2011, 
1:50 PM), http://blog.timesunion.com/capitol/archives/85444/autism-coverage-bill-is-law/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3BTK-KSE3. 
27 See, e.g., Tara A. Lavelle et al., Economic Burden of Childhood Autism Spectrum 
Disorders, 133 PEDIATRICS e520, e525–27 (2014) (describing the high costs associated with 
children diagnosed with autism spectrum disorders). 
28 See Kirsten Beronio et al., How the Affordable Care Act and Mental Health Parity 
and Addiction Equity Act Greatly Expand Coverage of Behavioral Health Care, 41 J. BEHAV. 
HEALTH SERVS. & RES. 410, 410–19 (2014) (describing the growth of insurance coverage 
for mental health disorders after the enactment of the Affordable Care Act and Mental Health 
Parity and Addiction Equity Act). 
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delivered in a public, state-financed system.29 At the time, most care for mental 
illness was long-term, institutional care, and plans were thus reluctant to cover the 
high cost of such intensive treatment. From the 1950s through early 1980s, as 
treatments for mental illness shifted away from institutional settings to various forms 
of outpatient care—psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, and medications such as the 
antipsychotic Thorazine that were developed in the 1950s and 1960s—private 
insurance plans began to include coverage for mental health treatment in their 
benefits package. But this treatment was often more limited, less available, and more 
liable to be cut than treatment for physical illnesses.30  
After viewing the distress caused by the restrictions on mental illness care, 
mental health advocates began a concentrated push in the 1990s for more parity in 
coverage between mental illness services and other types of medical care. Though 
the movement faced several setbacks, including a failed 1992 parity bill31 and the 
defeat of President Clinton’s national health care reform32 that would have mandated 
certain mental health benefits,33 Congress enacted the Mental Health Parity Act 
(MHPA) in 1996.34 Support for the act reached across both sides of the political 
aisle: Republican Senator Pete Domenici and Democratic Senator Paul Wellstone 
were the co-sponsors of the act.35 Yet despite having “parity” in the title, the act 
made only modest steps towards the true equalization of mental health care. The act 
did not mandate that employer-sponsored health plans offer mental health coverage; 
it only stipulated that if coverage was offered, the dollar limits needed to be equal to 
the dollar limits on other medical benefits.36 Furthermore, the act did not impose any 
limitations on other restrictive aspects of mental health coverage, such as high 
deductibles, high copayments, limits on days or visits, and plans were exempted if 
the cost of complying with parity exceeded the original cost of coverage by over 
1%.37 In response to the passage of the federal parity act, thirty-four states enacted 
                                                     
29 Steven S. Sharfstein & Anne M. Stoline, Reform Issues for Insuring Mental Health 
Care, 11 HEALTH AFF. 84, 85 (1992). 
30 Id. at 86. 
31 Colleen L. Barry et al., A Political History of Federal Mental Health and Addiction 
Insurance Parity, 88 MILBANK Q. 404, 409 (2010). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34  Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development, and 
Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-204, §§ 701–702, 712, 
2705, 110 Stat. 2874, 2944–50 (1996); Christopher Aaron Jones, Note, Legislative 
“Subterfuge”?: Failing to Insure Persons with Mental Illness Under the Mental Health 
Parity Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 50 VAND. L. REV. 753, 757 (1997). 
35 Barry et al., supra note 31, at 409. It is worth noting that the legislation was actually 
an amendment—Title VII-Parity in the Application of Certain Limits to Mental Health 
Benefits—added to a somewhat unrelated bill: the Department of Veterans Affairs and 
Housing and Urban Development, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act. See 
Roland Sturm & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, State Mental Health Parity Laws: Cause or 
Consequence of Differences in Use?, 18 HEALTH AFF. 182, 184 (1999). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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their own mental health parity laws in 1997, some of which mirrored the federal 
legislation as a show of support, while others were more generous parity mandates 
targeted at less burdensome patient cost-sharing for mental health services, 
expanded visit limits, and more expansive inpatient and outpatient benefits. 38 
Importantly, this first set of state parity mandates focused on expanding access to 
treatment for either all DSM diagnoses, which mandates referred to as “broad-based 
mental health disorders,” or all biologically-based or serious mental illnesses, which 
generally included “schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, psychotic disorders, 
bipolar disorder, major depression, panic disorders, and obsessive compulsive 
disorder.”39 Furthermore, the mandates generally focused on equal coverage with 
physical illnesses rather than singling out specific treatments. 40  This stands in 
contrast to autism insurance mandates that focus on guaranteeing coverage of a 
specific disorder and a specific set of treatments, such as ABA. For instance, 
California’s autism mandate specifies that it applies to “pervasive developmental 
disorder or autism” and that the treatments covered include “applied behavior 
analysis and evidence-based behavior intervention programs . . . .”41 
As Paul Wellstone, one of the Mental Health Parity Act’s sponsors, admitted, 
the MPHA was more symbolic than substantial, telling colleagues: “[W]e didn’t 
even get half a loaf, we just got crumbs but it’s a start.”42 In 2008, an expansion of 
the MPHA was enacted as part of President Bush’s 2008 economic bailout bill—the 
Paul Wellstone and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act 
of 2008 (MHPAE)—which targeted the areas of parity untouched by the original 
law.43 MHPAE prohibits group health plans (including self-insured employers that 
offer mental health and substance abuse benefits) from imposing financial 
requirements, such as copayments, deductibles, out-of-pocket expenses, or treatment 
limitations, that are more burdensome than requirements applied to all medical and 
surgical benefits covered by the plan.44  
                                                     
38 The states’ mandates, due to restrictions under the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) of 1973, do not apply to self-insured plans. Thomas C. Buchmueller 
et al., Parity For Whom? Exemptions and the Extent of State Mental Health Parity 
Legislation, 26 HEALTH AFF. w483, w483 (2007). As a result, many Americans with health 
coverage through a private employer are in plans that are not subject to state mandates. An 
analysis estimated that even though 45% of all private-sector employees with insurance lived 
in a state with a strong parity law, the ERISA self-insurance exemption halved the number 
of employees actually covered by these laws. See id. at w485–87. 
39 State Mental Health Parity Laws, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS (July 2009), 
http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=Parity1&Template=/ContentManagement/Co
ntentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=45313, archived at http://perma.cc/6LF8-L2NR. 
40 Id. 
41 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.73(a)(1), (c)(1) (West Supp. 2015). 
42 Barry et al., supra note 31, at 410. 
43 Id. at 405. 
44 David L. Shern et al., After Parity—What’s Next, 28 HEALTH AFF. 660, 660 (2008). 
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The legislation was intended to address significant barriers to care faced by 
those with mental illness.45 A survey conducted before the MHPAE was enacted 
found that 74% of workers with mental health benefits were subject to annual 
outpatient visit limits, 64% were subject to an inpatient visit limit, and 22% had 
higher cost sharing for mental health benefits than for general medical benefits.46 
Addressing these shortcomings, the MHPAE outlined more stringent requirements 
for what constitutes “parity.”47 The legislation overcame significant resistance by 
businesses, insurance companies, and some Republican legislators who argued that 
the legislation would drive up health insurance premiums, create adverse selection 
where plans offering more comprehensive benefits would attract people more likely 
to use those comprehensive services, and moral hazard where the presence of a 
mental health benefit would make patients enrolled in the plan more likely to use 
it.48 However, as an increasing body of academic research emerged showing that 
parity laws had a negligible impact on insurance premiums, opposition to parity laws 
from employers and insurance groups became less pronounced.49 
While the MHPA was characterized as a symbolic set of “crumbs,” mental 
health advocates viewed the MHPAE as a substantive step towards more equitable 
treatment for mental illness sufferers. Supporters of the bill viewed it as an important 
milestone in the quest for “civil rights” for the mentally ill, the effort to end 
                                                     
45 See Barry et al., supra note 31, at 405 (discussing problems before the legislation 
such as how “coverage for behavioral health care often required a higher level of cost sharing 
(e.g., coinsurance of 50 percent compared with 20 percent for outpatient medical services) 
and special service limits (e.g., twenty outpatient visits and thirty inpatient days per year)”). 
46 Colleen L. Barry et al., Design Of Mental Health Benefits: Still Unequal After All 
These Years, 22 HEALTH AFF. 127, 129 (2003). 
47  See Kevin Fiscella, Health Care Reform and Equity: Promise, Pitfalls, and 
Prescriptions, 9 ANNALS FAM. MED. 78, 80 (2011) (discussing how the parity provisions in 
the MHPAE improved upon disparities in cost between mental and physical illness 
treatments, as well as measures such as prohibiting differences in allowable length of hospital 
days for mental versus physical illnesses). 
48 See Barry et al., supra note 31, at 412–22. 
49 Id. at 412; see also Robert Pear, House Approves Bill on Mental Health Parity, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/06/washington/06health.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/X69B-79F4 (“Insurers and employers supported the Senate bill. 
Many opposed the House version, saying it would drive up costs.”). In addition, President 
Bush’s creation of the President’s New Freedom Commission on Mental Health in 2002, 
which reported that the mental health system was in “shambles,” lent a degree of presidential 
support to mental health parity legislation. John K. Iglehart, The Mental Health Maze and 
the Call for Transformation, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 507, 507 (2004). While various states 
had mental health parity laws more generous than even the 2008 federal legislation, by 
enacting the law at the federal level, the act specifically targeted plans exempt from state-
level mandates, such as self-insured plans typically adopted by large corporations. Barry et 
al., supra note 31, at 410–11. Though the legislation still left small employer and individual 
plans exempt, it applies to large plans, self-insured employers, Medicare Advantage, 
Medicaid managed care, and SCHIP. Id. at 407. The bill received more support from 
Democrats than from Republicans: “The vote was 268 to 148, with 47 Republicans joining 
221 Democrats in support of the measure.” Pear, supra. 
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insurance discrimination, and the move to reduce the stigma surrounding mental 
illness.50 The bill’s supporters included prominent Congressional advocates such as 
Democratic representative Patrick Kennedy who suffers from depression and 
Republican representative Jim Ramstad who suffers from alcoholism.51  
But, even the MHPAE left gaps in mental health coverage. For example, before 
the ACA, a health plan was not required to offer mental health benefits. Even after 
the ACA, a plan could still exercise a significant degree of control over which 
treatments are deemed “medically necessary” and therefore covered versus which 
treatments are deemed “experimental.”52 As a result, autism advocates have built on 
the language of mental health parity in advocating for state-level legislation that 
more explicitly requires coverage for autism treatment in insurance plans.53 Despite 
that fact that some state-level mental health parity laws define mental illness as any 
condition listed in the DSM, a definition that includes autism,54 autism advocates 
have sought more generous coverage than the parity guaranteed by federal and state 
legislation. For instance, under some mental illness parity legislation, insurers could 
still argue that treatments like ABA and other intensive behavioral interventions 
were “experimental” or “not medically necessary.” 55  Therefore, many of the 
mandates focused not only on guaranteeing general autism treatment but also 
guaranteeing a specific set of interventions, such as ABA. Indeed, 86.8% of the 
mandates passed between 2001 and October 2014 explicitly require coverage of 
ABA.56 As such, the state-level mandates go beyond existing parity legislation to 
single out a specific disease, autism, and a specific intensive set of treatments for 
that disease, ABA therapies, for mandated coverage.  
Part III, will discuss how these state-level mandates interact with the ACA’s 
attempts to mandate general categories of treatment through essential health 
benefits. For now, it is worth noting that the passage of these mandates means that 
the DSM-5 changes to the autism category provoked particular concern about 
                                                     
50 Barry et al., supra note 31, at 405, 409; Pear, supra note 49. 
51 Barry et al., supra note 31, at 405. 
52 For a discussion of insurers deeming autism treatment experimental or not medically 
necessary, see Laura C. Hoffman, Ensuring Access to Health Care for the Autistic Child: 
More Is Needed than Federal Health Care Reform, 41 SW. U. L. REV. 435, 452–55 (2012). 
53 See AUTISM SPEAKS, supra note 17. 
54 State Insurance Mandates for Autism Spectrum Disorder, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-
HEARING ASS’N, http://www.asha.org/Advocacy/state/States-Mental-Health-Parity-
Autism/, archived at http://perma.cc/A3NL-4M7J (last visited Mar. 21, 2015) (listing 
Hawaii, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, and Washington as states with 
mental health parity laws that may include autism spectrum disorder as a covered mental 
illness). 
55 Tom Reinke, States Increasingly Mandate Special Autism Services, MANAGED CARE 
(Aug. 2008), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0808/0808.autism.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/CN3L-6PE7. 
56 This figure and subsequent analyses are conducted from a database created by the 
author of mandates by state and features of those mandates. See Rebecca Johnson, Appendix 
I: Mandate Database ABA Yesorno (2014) (on file with Utah Law Review), archived at 
http://perma.cc/2PNR-H7FQ. 
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service loss given that the mandates explicitly singled out autism, Asperger’s, and 
PDD-NOS as eligible diagnoses. On a television news show discussing the DSM-5 
autism revisions, the news anchors posed the question: “[W]hen they change the 
definition, the symptoms for kids who were previously on the spectrum won’t 
change, they will still have their same symptoms of anti-social behavior, or whatever 
it is; however, they won’t be able to get coverage?”57 Jodi Bouer, a lawyer who 
specializes in insurance litigation to help families, responded that the changes 
threatened services guaranteed by mandates:  
 
They won’t be able to get coverage, because the state mandates basically 
lay out the diagnoses that require coverage, and within the scope of those 
mandates, typically, it’s autism, Asperger’s, PDD-NOS. PDD-NOS and 
Asperger’s is no longer going to exist. A large—or a portion of the 
children who have those symptoms, don’t have social communication 
disorders and repetitive behaviors. They are no longer going to be 
considered autistic, so the statutes are not going to protect them anymore.58  
 
Therefore, the fact that advocates had pressed for policies singling out autism 
in mandates made fears about service loss with DSM-5 changes especially acute. 
Especially since these entitlements are tightly coupled with the broader DSM 
category. 
 
2.  State Level Factors Behind Mandates’ Passage 
 
Autism advocacy groups have been highly successful in passing the state-level 
mandates. As Figure 1 illustrates, as of October 2014, thirty-eight states and 
territories have passed autism insurance legislation. Yet as the figure also illustrates, 
other states still have not yet passed mandates. In addition, the states that have passed 
mandates did so at varying speeds. Some states passed a mandate in 2008, while 
others passing a mandate in 2011, despite the fact that autism advocacy 
organizations were exerting high pressure on state legislatures throughout this 
period. And since the passage of the mandate is an important DSM-linked 
entitlement, what explains why some states either did not pass a mandate or were 
slow to do so? This question is important for understanding DSM-linked 
entitlements because it helps explain why some states pass mandates, which create 
a stronger diagnosis-entitlement link for autism, while other states fail to pass 
mandates, and thus create a weaker diagnosis-entitlement link.  
A previous analysis studied features of a state that predict the passage of a 
mandate between the years 2005 and 2012, a period in which thirty U.S. states and 
                                                     
57 Transcript of Redefinition of Autism on FOX & Friends, ELIZABETH BIRT CTR. FOR 
AUTISM LAW & ADVOCACY, http://www.ebcala.org/areas-of-law/transcript-of-redefinition-
of-autism-on-fox-friends/, archived at http://perma.cc/ZQ8J-UACY (last visited Mar. 21, 
2015). 
58 Id. 
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mandates passed autism insurance legislation. 59  Analyzing data on state-level 
features that predict the passage of an insurance mandate shows that states that have 
a stronger existing autism service infrastructure—measured by the density of 
pediatricians per child and higher levels of identified autism prevalence, which is 
related to the strength of services to detect the disorder—are significantly more 
likely to pass a mandate than states with a weaker service infrastructure. This notion 
is called the “cumulative advantage” outcome of a mandate passage. 60  Since 
mandates help alleviate family financial burdens for autism treatment,61 and also are 
likely to spark the development of autism services within a state,62 the cumulative 
advantage outcome means that states with stronger existing autism services are more 
likely to pass mandates that, by creating a close DSM-diagnosis-service entitlement 
link, further bolster service access for children living within that state.  
 
B.  Special Education Benefits 
 
While the insurance benefits that the mandates guarantee are an important part 
of autism treatment, autism’s status as a neurodevelopmental condition63 with onset 
in early childhood means that special education benefits are an important service 
provided by schools.64 The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 
                                                     
59 See Johnson et al., supra note 19, at 805 (discussing “why some US states have passed 
autism insurance mandates and asking whether these reasons for a mandate’s passage make 
the variation the mandates create ethically acceptable”). 
60 Id. at 809. 
61 Parish et al., supra note 19, at 194. 
62  See generally A. Celeste Harvey et al., Funding of Applied Behavior Analysis 
Services: Current Status and Growing Opportunities, 7 PSYCHOL. SERVICES 202, 208 
(2010), for background on various state’s involvement with autism services, stating that 
“[t]he demand for ABA services has grown significantly in the past decade as the prevalence 
of autism has increased dramatically.” The effect of mandate passage on autism service 
development within a state has not been studied directly. However, there are indications that 
ABA practitioners and other service providers closely monitor the progress of autism 
insurance legislation. For instance, the authors discuss funding streams for ABA and mention 
Autism Speaks’ successful efforts at passing private insurance mandates. Id. at 202–03, 208. 
The authors argue that many of the mandates in effect in 2009 did not explicitly require 
coverage of ABA. Id. at 208. However, as my analysis shows, since then, nearly all of the 
mandates (86.8%) appear to require ABA. Therefore, we can imagine the successful passage 
of mandates requiring private insurance coverage of ABA to provide financial incentives for 
more ABA practitioners, clinics, and service infrastructure surrounding the diagnosis. 
63  “[N]eurodevelopmental disorders are a group of conditions with onset in the 
developmental period. The disorders typically manifest early in development, often before 
the child enters grade school, and are characterized by developmental deficits that produce 
impairments of personal, social, academic, or occupational functioning.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 31 (5th ed. 2013) 
[hereinafter AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5]. 
64 See, e.g., Michael Siller et al., Longitudinal Change in the Use of Services in Autism 
Spectrum Disorder: Understanding the Role of Child Characteristics, Family 
Demographics, and Parent Cognitions, 18 AUTISM 433, 442–44 (2014) (discussing how 
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guarantees that each child has a right to a “free appropriate public education,” and 
instructs evaluation committees within schools to use diagnostic criteria for 
disability categories that are outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).65 
Autism was first added as a distinct disability category when the Act was 
reauthorized in 1990, under the new name of the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA), with implementation of the first autism category required in 
1992.66 Since its addition, there have been large yearly increases in the percentage 
of children seeking services under the autism IDEA category. Utilization rates are 
reported by state, and one study, focusing on Wisconsin, documented an increase 
from 4.9 cases per 1,000 children in 2002 to 9.0 cases per 1,000 children in 2008.67 
The present analysis, examining data from all fifty U.S. states and District of 
Columbia from the years 2006 to 2010, documents that every state, except Iowa, 
exhibited an increase in autism special education utilization for the autism 
category.68 The average change was 2.9 additional cases per 1,000 children, with 
Maine exhibiting the largest increase with an increase from 11.5 cases per 1,000 
children in 2006 to 18.5 cases per 1,000 children in 2010.69  
What explains this increase in utilization of special education services for 
autism? Furthermore, what explains state-by-state variations in this rate of increase? 
Addressing these questions is important for understanding links between medical 
and educational DSM-linked entitlements. One answer, which was used as a policy 
rationale for the passage of insurance mandates, was that the mandates would 
substitute for special education services—the passage of a private insurance mandate 
would decrease special education utilization of and expenditures on autism 
services.70 This answer suggests that special education and medical services for 
                                                     
children receive an average of 15.5 hours/week of school-based services, noting that these 
services are utilized more highly by African-American and Hispanic children as compared 
to Caucasian and Asian children, and highlighting the important role of publicly-funded 
special education in service provision for underserved minorities). 
65 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 3(c), 89 
Stat. 773, 775 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012)). 
66 Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, §§ 
101(a), 901(a), 104 Stat. 1103, 1103, 1141–51 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
20 U.S.C. (2012)). 
67 Matthew J. Maenner & Maureen S. Durkin, Trends in the Prevalence of Autism on 
the Basis of Special Education Data, 126 PEDIATRICS e1018, e1020 (2010). 
68  See Historical State-Level IDEA Data Files, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE & 
DISSEMINATION NETWORK, http://tadnet.public.tadnet.org/pages/712, archived at 
http://perma.cc/W7PU-RNK4 (last visited Mar. 21 2015). 
69 Id.; See Rebecca Johnson, Appendix II: Change in IDEA Prevalence of Autism 
(2014) (on file with Utah Law Review), archived at http://perma.cc/7TLK-QRPZ. 
70 See, e.g., Laura Shumaker, Renewal of Autism Insurance Mandate Clears State 
Senate, SFGATE (May 16, 2013, 4:55 PM), 
http://blog.sfgate.com/lshumaker/2013/05/16/renewal-of-autism-insurance-mandate-clears-
state-senate/, archived at http://perma.cc/R4XV-63DA (reporting that the California State 
Senate passed legislation “requiring health insurance companies to provide coverage” for 
autism treatment). 
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autism are interdependent, and that better insurance coverage of autism treatment 
decreases the uptake of special education-funded treatment for autism. In contrast, a 
different view of the policies’ interdependency is if they are complements. That is, 
better insurance coverage of autism treatment increases the uptake of special 
education-funded treatments. Addressing this debate, this section turns to analyzing 
whether a state’s passage of a mandate leads to a decrease in special education 
autism utilization, slower growth in utilization, or higher growth in utilization 
compared to states that do not pass mandates. This analysis, as well as the descriptive 
information outlined in the Article’s tables and figures, uses STATA version 12.1 
(2011).71 
 
1.  Data72 
 
The dependent variable in my regression was the utilization rates for the autism 
special education category, separated by state. Estimates of the number of children 
receiving special education services for autism are derived from the Individual with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) child count data, which provides yearly counts 
of special education services for 2006 through 2010.73 For children with multiple 
diagnoses, the data classify the child according to the child’s primary diagnosis. 
The main independent variable of interest was the presence or absence of a 
private insurance mandate in a state. Yet other features of a state might affect the 
rate of special education autism utilization, so the regression includes several other 
state-level factors as independent variables. First, I used a state’s median income 
measured by the U.S. Census Bureau.74 Second, to examine whether some states are 
particularly likely to pass mandates regardless of what the mandates actually cover, 
the analysis includes a variable for the total number of other insurance mandates that 
a state has.75 Third, to measure a state’s political affiliation, a composite variable for 
each state that examined the state house majority affiliation, state senate majority 
affiliation, and governor’s political affiliation, giving each political area a score of 
                                                     
71 StataCorp, Stata Statistical Software: Release 12.1 (2011). 
72 The data the author used to run the regressions in the sections that follow is digitally 
archived on the Utah Law Review website. See Rebecca Johnson, Appendix III: Autism 
Regression Data (2014) (on file with Utah Law Review), archived at http://perma.cc/E43Z-
6PV4. The data is organized so that each row corresponds to a specific state and year. For 
example, Alabama has a 2005 year in row 2, a 2006 year in row 3, a 2007 year in row 4, and 
so forth. 
73 See Historical State-Level IDEA Data Files, supra note 68. 
74  AMANDA NOSS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME: 2013: AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY BRIEFS 3 tbl.1 (2014), available at 
http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acsbr13-02.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/P8V8-8HP2. 
75 VICTORIA CRAIG BUNCE & JP WIESKE, COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS., 
HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATES IN THE STATES 2010, at 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/MandatesintheStates2010ExecSummary.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/N5AY-JMH2. 
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either 0 = Democrat, 1 = independent, or 2 = Republican was created. 76  The 
composite variable ranged from 0 (most liberal, all affiliations were Democrat) to 6 
(most conservative, all affiliations were Republican). Fourth, because self-insured 
insurance plans are exempt from following the mandates, data from the 2010 
Medical Expenditures Panel Survey (MEPS) was used to measure the percentage of 
exempt plans.77 Finally, because the rate of special education autism utilization 
could be affected by the criteria each state uses to determine whether a child qualifies 
for an autism diagnosis, a variable was included measuring whether the state was 
“generous” in allowing persons to access the autism category, which meant that the 
state explicitly includes Asperger’s and PDD-NOS in their autism disability criteria 
(twenty states or territories) or “not generous” if it only specified that persons with 
autism meet the criteria (thirty-one states or territories).78 Descriptive statistics are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
2.  Model Specification 
 
The dependent variable in the model looks at the rate of special education 
utilization under the autism category (measured as number of children per 1,000) 
and examines the utilization by year. Likewise, the main independent variable of 
interest in the model examines not only that a state passes a mandate but also which 
year it passes a mandate, and then looks at how the passage of a mandate in that year 
affects special education utilization in subsequent years. The model, called a 
difference-in-differences approach (DD), exploits two sources of variation to 
examine which factors affect rates of special education utilization. First is variation 
between states—comparing, for example, the rates of special education utilization 
in states that pass a mandate versus those that do not. Second is variation within a 
state over time—so, for example, if California passes an insurance mandate in 2011, 
the model compares what happens to California’s special education utilization rates 
after it passes a mandate compared to before it passes a mandate. The linear 
regression model is specified as follows, with special education utilization within a 
specific state, in a specific year, for the autism category as the dependent variable 
and with i = state and t = year. The fixed effects control variables for state and year 
control for time-invariant characteristics of a state that affect special education rates 
                                                     
76 2011 State and Legislative Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/statevote/LegisControl_ 
2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/49C3-ZC45. 
77 Data Overview, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/data_overview.jsp, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
K45J-3FJ2. The data used was from the 2010 iteration of MEPS for the following item: 
“Percent of private-sector establishments that offer health insurance that self-insure at least 
one plan by firm size and State.” Percent of private-sector establishments, AGENCY FOR 
HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY (2010), http://meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/data_stats/summ_ 
tables/insr/state/series_2/2010/tiia2a.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/5AFJ-BBH2.  
78 MacFarlane & Kanaya, supra note 23, at 666 tbl.3. 
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and national trends that might affect general special education rates but that do not 
affect state-by-state variation in these rates: 
 
autism special education utilizationit =  β1 * Mandateit + β2 * median 
incomeit +  β3 * percent ERISA exemptionsit + β4 *  total state mandatesit 
+ d5 * state political affiliationit + i6 * special education criteria generosityit 
+ ϒi + θt  + εit (1).79 
 
3.  Results80 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the model. The presence of an autism insurance 
mandate significantly predicts differential increases in autism special education 
utilization in states that pass a mandate compared to states that do not. The only 
other variable that significantly predicted differences in special education utilization 
was the percent of private insurers exempt from the mandate’s requirement under 
ERISA, with an increase in the percent of exempt insurers in a state associated with 
lower growth of autism special education utilization.  
Second, although special education utilization in the autism category increased 
in most states from the years 2005 to 2010, states that passed a mandate showed a 
significantly greater increase in special education utilization in the years following 
the mandate’s passage compared to states without a mandate. Furthermore, among 
states with a mandate, states where a higher percentage of private insurers were 
required to follow the mandate and cover autism services showed greater increases 
in special education utilization than states where fewer insurers were required to 
follow the mandate and cover autism services. In other words, the greater the extent 
that insurance plans in a state were required to follow its autism coverage mandate, 
the greater the state’s increase in autism special education utilization.  
 
4.  Implications of the Findings for Understanding DSM Diagnosis-Entitlement 
Coupling 
 
Despite the framing of mandates as a way to shift some of the costs of autism 
from publicly financed special education to private insurance, the results question 
whether the mandates achieve this result. Instead, the results suggest a more rapid 
increase in special education service utilization for states that mandate private 
insurance coverage compared to states that do not mandate such coverage. This lends 
support to viewing DSM-linked entitlements as an interdependent web, rather than 
                                                     
79 Rebbecca Johnson, Appendix IV: Regression STATA Do File (2014) (on file with 
Utah Law Review), archived at http://perma.cc/CK79-PNBW; Rebecca Johnson, Appendix 
V: CSV file of Data for Regression (2014) (on file with Utah Law Review), archived at 
http://perma.cc/3MVF-LTKW. 
80 The print out of the results from the regression model are digitally archived on the 
Utah Law Review website as Appendix VI. See Rebecca Johnson, Appendix VI: Regression 
STATA Output (2014) (on file with Utah Law Review), archived at http://perma.cc/3FU8-
Z4YH.  
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independent, siloed services. In particular, the findings show that the DSM category 
of autism impacts services through multiple routes. First it has an effect through the 
passage of private insurance mandates that explicitly single out autism for mandated 
treatment. Second, a state’s passage of a private insurance mandate for autism leads 
to a faster rate of increase in utilization of special education autism services. As a 
result, changes to DSM categories can threaten service access through each of these 
routes.  
Before moving from outlining the pre DSM-5 policy landscape to focusing on 
how this landscape might change in the wake of the DSM-5, it is important to note 
limitations of the interdependency analysis. First it is important to note that the data 
sources measured special education utilization rather than special education 
expenditures, with the latter data not systematically available. The passage of a 
mandate in a state could increase special education utilization while decreasing per 
pupil expenditures. Data on special education expenditures during the 1999/2000 
school year found that 24% of the special education expenditures for autism go to 
“related service providers,” 81  which include speech/language specialists, 
physical/occupational therapists, vision specialists, psychologists, social workers, 
and personal health aides. Some state mandates explicitly require insurers to cover 
services by these providers; for example, the Arkansas insurance mandate defines 
covered therapeutic care to include “services provided by licensed speech therapists, 
occupational therapists, or physical therapists.”82 Therefore, it is feasible that if 
mandates reduce expenditures on this component of special education services, 
mandates may reduce overall special education expenditures on autism while 
nevertheless increasing the number of children receiving some autism special 
education services. Future research should explore these possibilities. For now, it is 
worth noting that utilization of the two DSM-linked entitlements sharply increased 
in the years preceding the DSM-5 revisions, and that an increase in uptake of medical 
entitlements leads to a faster increase in the use of special education entitlements. 
This shows how changes that affect the use of medical services for autism will also 
impact the use of special education services. 
 
III.  IMPACT OF THE DSM-5 CHANGES ON MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL 
ENTITLEMENTS 
 
Now that this Article has outlined the pre DSM-5 policy landscape and, in 
particular, the interplay between increased private insurance coverage of autism 
services and an increasing rate of special education service use for the autism 
category, this section turns to the potential impacts of the DSM-5 revisions to the 
autism category. The DSM-5 collapsed four DSM-IV categories—autistic disorder, 
                                                     
81 JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL., SPECIAL EDUC. EXPENDITURE PROJECT, AM. INSTS. FOR 
RESEARCH IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIS., TOTAL EXPENDITURES FOR STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES, 1999-2000: SPENDING VARIATION BY DISABILITY 30 app. C (2003), available 
at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED481398.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G37B-8HFV. 
82 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-418(a)(13) (2014). 
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Asperger’s disorder, childhood integrative disorder, and pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS)—into a combined autism category, 
and also included severity level specifiers indicating how much support the child 
needs. 83  The DSM-5 also contains a new category, social (pragmatic) 
communication disorder (SCD), that is aimed at diagnosing children who exhibit 
impairments in social communication that are similar to those of children with 
autism but who lack children with autism’s repetitive and restricted behavior.84 
Since details of how SCD will interact with autism policies remain unclear given the 
disorder’s newness, the present section will focus on how the collapse of the separate 
neurodevelopmental diagnoses of Asperger’s, PDD-NOS, and autistic disorder into 
a single autism spectrum category will impact service access. 
As discussed, the changes sparked fears about service endangerment, with 
leading media outlets—including The New York Times; Reuter’s Health; The 
Chicago Tribune; and The Washington Post—noting that the combined category 
might endanger access to services for some subset of patients who met the DSM-
IV-TR definitions of autism, Asperger’s, or PDD-NOS.85 This section will address 
whether these fears about service endangerment are warranted. As Part II 
emphasized, we must think about how DSM changes impact an interdependent 
ecology of services rather than separate, siloed services. With this approach in mind, 
the present section focuses on how the DSM-5 changes interact with three policy 
categories: private insurance mandates for autism services; the ACA’s essential 
health benefits that affect whether a mandate’s guarantees will be codified in state 
regulations or undermined by the ACA; and finally, state variation in special 
education criteria for autism. The section begins by looking at two ways in which 
the DSM changes may negatively impact access to autism services—an analysis that 
shows that media fears about service endangerment are grounded in empirical 
                                                     
83 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, HIGHLIGHTS OF CHANGES FROM DSM-IV-TR TO DSM-5, 
at 1–2 (2013), available at http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/changes%20from%20dsm-iv-
tr%20to%20dsm-5.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XXD6-BTJ8. 
84 Id. at 1. See generally Lauren B. Swineford et al., Social (Pragmatic) Communication 
Disorder: A Research Review of this New DSM-5 Diagnostic Category, 6 J. 
NEURODEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 41 (2014) (explaining the history behind SCD and 
evaluating the decision to include the disorder in the DSM-5 manual). 
85 See, e.g., Carey, supra note 3; Wendy Donahue, Autism Diagnostic Changes Shuffle 
the Puzzle, CHI. TRIB. (July 2, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-07-
02/health/sc-health-0625-autism-kids-20140702_1_pdd-nos-developmental-disorders-
autism-rates, archived at http://perma.cc/YAH9-M9F3; Lena H. Sun, Psychiatry’s 
Revamped Guidebook Fuels Debate, WASH. POST, May 17, 2013, at A1. Despite the fact that 
the DSM-5 changes would also collapse childhood disintegrative disorder (CDD) into the 
combined autism category, most articles focused on PDD-NOS and especially Asperger’s 
when discussing the category changes. Because of this focus, and because CDD is very rare 
compared to other autistic disorders (an estimated one to six per 100,000 children as 
compared to autism’s recent one in 150 during the same 2002 time period), I will also 
predominantly focus on how the changes will affect those with autism, Asperger’s, and PDD-
NOS. For a discussion of CDD’s prevalence, see Eric Fombonne, Prevalence of Childhood 
Disintegrative Disorder, 6 AUTISM 149, 152–55 (2002). 
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realities. However, this section then discusses two overlooked ways in which the 
DSM changes interact with policy developments to bolster access to autism services 
rather than endanger access. Ultimately, it is impossible to definitively predict what 
impact the DSM-5 changes will have on service access because the change’s impact 
depends on how doctors use the new category and what policies advocacy groups 
focus on next. Instead of a definitive prediction, the section focuses on presenting a 
more balanced picture of the DSM-5’s impact on autism service access than present 
accounts that focus solely on service endangerment.  
 
A.  Evidence for Service Endangerment 
 
1.  Diagnosis Loss 
 
The first piece of evidence that the DSM-5 changes may endanger access to 
services are the studies that apply the new DSM-5 criteria to children diagnosed with 
Asperger’s, autism, and PDD-NOS under the DSM-IV-TR and that show some of 
these children no longer qualify for a diagnosis under the new criteria. The research 
that first attracted headlines about the DSM-5 changes resulting in service 
endangerment found that 39.4% of participants in the DSM-IV field trials who 
qualified for a diagnosis of autism, Asperger’s, or PDD-NOS no longer qualified for 
the DSM-5’s combined autism category.86 However, a recent systematic review that 
pooled this analysis with other analyses of the percentage of DSM-IV-TR autism, 
Asperger’s, and PDD-NOS patients who would not qualify for a diagnosis under the 
DSM-5 found a wide range of estimates: 7.3% to 68.4% of persons diagnosed under 
the DSM-IV-TR losing the diagnosis in the DSM-5.87 That review found an average 
diagnosis loss of 31% of those children diagnosed under the DSM-IV-TR criteria.88 
In contrast, a study that Autism Speaks itself has advertised as important in applying 
the codified DSM-5 criteria, predicts a much lower service loss of 9% of previously 
diagnosed patients.89 
These epidemiological and clinical studies show that there is no consensus on 
the extent to which persons will lose a diagnosis, but that there is agreement that at 
least some fraction of those diagnosed under the DSM-IV-TR will not qualify for a 
diagnosis under DSM-5 criteria. And a failure to qualify for a DSM-5 autism 
                                                     
86 McPartland et al., supra note 4, at 376. 
87  See Kristine M. Kulage et al., How Will DSM-5 Affect Autism Diagnosis? A 
Systematic Literature Review and Meta-analysis, 44 J. AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL 
DISORDERS 1918, 1920–21 (2014). 
88 Id. at 1927. 
89 For the study itself, see Marisela Huerta et al., Application of DSM-5 Criteria for 
Autism Spectrum Disorder to Three Samples of Children with DSM-IV Diagnoses of 
Pervasive Developmental Disorders, 169 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1056, 1056–64 (2012). For 
Autism Speaks’ discussion of the study, see Large DSM-5 Study Suggests Most Children 
Will Keep ASD Diagnosis, AUTISM SPEAKS (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.autismspeaks.org/ 
science/science-news/large-dsm-5-study-suggests-most-children-will-keep-asd-diagnosis, 
archived at http://perma.cc/LE7B-FZQJ. 
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diagnosis translates into a risk of medical and educational service loss. The private 
insurance mandates specify that a child must be diagnosed with an autistic disorder 
to qualify for mandated services, meaning that those without an autism diagnosis 
will retain general insurance coverage and the treatments the insurer is willing to 
cover but will lose specific mandated access to autism treatments.  
For special education services, a loss of a DSM diagnosis may affect service 
access during the evaluation step of special education service provision, where either 
a parent or a school requests an evaluation of the child for the purposes of seeing 
whether the child qualifies for special education services. The IDEA specifies that 
this evaluation must not rely on any single instrument or procedure, thus precluding 
the use of DSM criteria as the sole means for identifying a child with autism.90 State 
guidance more explicitly instructs evaluators to not conflate a medical diagnosis of 
autism with a special educational diagnosis. For instance, Wisconsin’s guide to 
autism evaluators in special education emphasizes that a medical diagnosis neither 
automatically qualifies a child for the autism educational disability category, nor is 
a medical diagnosis required to qualify for the category: 
 
NOTE: A medical diagnosis of an autism spectrum disorder is not required 
in order to determine whether a student meets eligibility criteria for the 
educational impairment area of autism. If medical information is available 
it should be considered as part of the Individual Evaluation Program (IEP) 
team’s evaluation but must not be the sole component. School personnel 
may not require parents to obtain a medical diagnosis of an autism 
spectrum disorder before proceeding with an educational evaluation . . . . 
 
NOTE: A medical diagnosis of an autism spectrum disorder does not result 
in automatic eligibility for special education under the impairment area of 
autism. It is also possible for a student to have the educational impairment 
of autism but not need special education services.91 
 
Despite these warnings, comparative prevalence rates suggest that a special 
education disability diagnosis of autism is more difficult to obtain than a medical 
diagnosis: the most recent CDC medical prevalence data reports one in sixty-eight 
children (1.5%) in 2010 had an autism diagnosis, while 2010 special education 
diagnosis reported an average of 8 in 1,000 (0.8%).92 Therefore, it seems that a child 
who has difficulty obtaining a medical diagnosis of autism under the new criteria 
will also have difficulty qualifying for special education services under the autism 
category. While the child may qualify under a different disability category such as 
                                                     
90 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(6)(B) (2012). 
91 WIS. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, EDUCATIONAL EVALUATION GUIDE FOR AUTISM, 
at 1, 4 (2009), available at http://sped.dpi.wi.gov/sites/default/files/imce/sped/pdf/elg-
autism-guide.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3ZEB-GF4J. 
92  See Autism Prevalance, AUTISM SPEAKS, https://www.autismspeaks.org/what-
autism/prevalence, archived at https://perma.cc/S85U-JXUR (last visited Mar. 26, 2015); 
Facts About ASD, supra note 12; Historical State-Level IDEA Data Files, supra note 68. 
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“emotional disturbance,”93 the services associated with this category may not be as 
intensive or well-tailored to their problems as those associated with autism. 
Yet there are two factors that might lessen the extent to which the DSM-5 
results in a loss of a diagnosis. First is that in response to the DSM-5 changes, Autism 
Speaks has begun to successfully advocate for amendments to state private insurance 
mandates to specify that persons with autism receiving insurance coverage before 
the DSM-5’s publication should continue to receive the same benefits after the 
DSM-5’s publication.94 Though Connecticut is the only state to have passed an 
amendment, Autism Speaks has noted its commitment to insuring that the DSM-5 
change does not result in service loss, listing the contact information for the Autism 
Speaks advocacy team for persons who experience issues with insurance coverage 
under the new DSM-5.95  
Second are efforts to clarify that children who were previously diagnosed with 
autism should retain their diagnosis and not necessarily be reevaluated using the new 
DSM-5 criteria. A special note was added to the DSM-5 autism criteria before 
publication emphasizing this diagnostic retention:  
 
Note: Individuals with a well-established DSM-IV diagnosis of autistic 
disorder, Asperger’s disorder, or pervasive developmental disorder not 
otherwise specified should be given the diagnosis of autism spectrum 
disorder. Individuals who have marked deficits in social communication, 
but whose symptoms do not otherwise meet criteria for autism spectrum 
disorder, should be evaluated for social (pragmatic) communication 
disorder.96  
 
After the DSM-5’s publication, authoritative bodies such as the Interagency Autism 
Coordinating Committee (IACC), a federal advisory committee that coordinates 
autism-focused efforts within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
                                                     
93 See MacFarlane & Kanaya, supra note 23, at 667 (discussing how a child with an 
autism spectrum disorder like PDD-NOS or Asperger’s might qualify under the different 
disability categories of ‘other health impairment’ or ‘emotional disturbance’); see also 
Malinda L. Pennington et al., Defining Autism: Variability in State Education Agency 
Definitions of and Evaluations for Autism Spectrum Disorders, 2014 AUTISM RES. & 
TREATMENT 1, 3–7 (2014) (discussing how many states specify that if a child qualifies for 
special education under the emotional disturbance category, the child cannot also qualify 
under the autism category as the primary diagnosis. The authors note that many children with 
autism have co-occurring emotional disorders or problems that may lead them to qualify 
under that category). 
94  CT Legislature Passes DSM-V Bill, AUTISM SPEAKS (May 31, 2013), 
http://www.autismspeaks.org/advocacy/advocacy-news/ct-legislature-passes-dsm-v-bill, 
archived at http://perma.cc/PG5G-AWP5. To see the Connecticut bill, see CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 38a-514b (West Supp. 2014). 
95  Answers to Frequently Asked Questions about DSM-5, AUTISM SPEAKS, 
http://www.autismspeaks.org/dsm-5/faq, archived at http://perma.cc/W7UR-SG7J (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2015). 
96 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-5, supra note 63, at 51. 
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repeated this emphasis on the importance of persons retaining a diagnosis, 
emphasizing in a public statement that, “[i]t is important for families, individuals on 
the spectrum, and practitioners to know that individuals who currently have a 
diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD) based on the DSM-IV system will 
retain an ASD diagnosis for the purposes of qualifying for clinical and educational 
services. Individuals who currently have a diagnosis of ASD are not required to be 
‘re-diagnosed’ with the new system in order to qualify for ASD services.”97 This 
repeated emphasis on children not losing a DSM-IV-TR diagnosis, both in the DSM-
5 text itself and in public statements by government agencies and advocacy groups, 
may lessen the extent to which the DSM-5 changes result in diagnosis loss. In turn, 
the impact on access to medical and educational services may be less dramatic than 
initially depicted. 
 
2.  Essential Health Benefits Threatening the Mandates 
 
While the first service endangerment threat comes from the DSM-5 itself, the 
second service endangerment threat arises from the ACA implementation that is 
taking place at the same time as the DSM-5 implementation. The ACA mandates the 
coverage of specific mental health benefits for private insurance plans by defining a 
minimum federal standard of Essential Health Benefits (EHB) that include: “mental 
health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment.”98 
Starting in 2014, all plans on the individual and small group market, whether listed 
on a state health exchange or not, must include essential health benefits.99 States are 
given the power to define their own EHBs based on one of four benchmark plans: 
one of the three largest small group plans, one of the three largest state employee 
plans, one of the three largest federal employees plans, or the largest HMO plan in 
the state’s commercial market. The state, rather than private insurers, is then held 
financially liable for state-mandated services that are not included in this benchmark 
plan beginning in 2016.100 In other words, if a state chooses a benchmark plan that 
does not cover comprehensive autism services, and if the state nevertheless requires 
                                                     
97  INTERAGENCY AUTISM COORDINATING COMM., STATEMENT REGARDING 
SCIENTIFIC, PRACTICE AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES IN THE DIAGNOSTIC 
CRITERIA FOR AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDER 1, 6–7 (2014), available at 
http://iacc.hhs.gov/publications/2014/statement_iacc_dsm5_changes_criteria_040214.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/6VSU-2KYT. 
98 See AMANDA CASSIDY ET AL., HEALTH AFFAIRS, HEALTH POLICY BRIEF 1–2 (2012), 
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_68.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/66XD-QJGT. 
99 Self-insured health plans, large group plans, and grandfathered health plans that 
existed at the time of the ACA’s enactment and have not significantly changed their benefit 
or premium structure since then, are exempt. Id. at 2. 
100  See generally Michelle Andrews, Health Law Tempers New State Coverage 
Mandates, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 16, 2014), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/health-
law-tempers-new-state-coverage-mandates, archived at http://perma.cc/W4CE-7XBX 
(“[T]he law requires states, not insurers, to cover the cost of mandates . . . .”). 
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that plans cover comprehensive autism services, the state must cover the cost of 
those comprehensive services. When this process for choosing EHBs was 
announced, autism advocates pressed for ABA to be included as a mandated EHB 
in the federally defined minimum category.101 Yet the federal government did not 
specify that ABA was an EHB, and instead only mentioned “behavioral health 
treatment” in general. 102  Has this policy development, which weakens the link 
between a DSM autism diagnosis and expensive autism services like ABA, 
endangered service access? Put simply, have the ACA’s EHB requirements 
undermined the mandates’ attempts to guarantee access to certain autism services? 
Two developments mitigate the ACA’s negative impact on autism service 
access. First the success of autism advocacy groups in pressing states to choose a 
benchmark plan that contains mandated services like ABA. A report analyzing 
states’ choices of benchmark plans found that twenty-five states plus the District of 
Columbia chose benchmark plans that cover ABA.103 To analyze not only how many 
states have EHBs that include intensive autism services but also what proportion of 
children with autism live in those states, data was combined from two sources. First, 
data was gathered from the 2009/2010 National Survey of Children with Special 
Healthcare Needs (NS-CSHCN), which reports the percentage of children eighteen 
years old and younger with autism living in each state.104 Second data was gathered 
from the 2010 U.S. census, which reports the number of children eighteen and 
younger living in each state.105 Combined, these highlight the proportion of children 
with autism living in states that fall into the following four categories, arranged in 
increasing order of service security: states with no autism mandate and no EHB 
inclusion of intensive autism services (hereafter “EHB coverage”), states with a 
mandate but no EHB coverage, states with EHB coverage and no mandate, and 
finally, states with both EHB coverage and a mandate (Figure 2). As the figure 
illustrates, the majority of children with autism (58.2%) live in states that have both 
a mandate guaranteeing services and explicit EHB inclusion of intensive autism 
services. For the 25.6% of children with autism living in states with a mandate but 
no EHB coverage, a second policy development may help secure their continued 
                                                     
101  See, e.g., Michelle Diament, Feds Omit ABA Therapy From New Insurance 
Requirements, DISABILITY SCOOP (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.disabilityscoop.com/2013/02 
/22/feds-aba-insurance/17346, archived at http://perma.cc/US8X-D89K. 
102 Id. 
103 See ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: 50-STATE 
VARIATIONS ON A THEME 2 (2014), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/ 
reports/issue_briefs/2014/rwjf416179, archived at http://perma.cc/X8PV-HZ8Y. 
104 Data query from the Child and Adolescent Health Measurement Initiative, Browse 
by Survey & Topic, DATA RES. CTR. FOR CHILD & ADOLESCENT HEALTH, 
http://www.childhealthdata.org/browse/survey, archived at http://perma.cc/7WSQ-G4ZS 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2015) (“To [use this] interactive search: 1) Select a Survey, Survey 
Year, and State or Region. 2) Select your desired Topic/Starting Point. 3) Select your 
indicator or measure. This will direct you to a results page where you can compare across 
states, regions and by numerous subgroups.”). 
105 NOSS, supra note 74. 
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access to intensive autism services. Namely, states are clarifying that the mandates 
do not apply to the individual and small group insurance plans that are required to 
cover essential health benefits, but that they do apply to large group plans.106 This 
second policy development increases the likelihood that mandates still apply to some 
of the plans in states where EHBs do not cover intensive autism services. 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of Children with Autism in Each Insurance Service Category107 
  
 
B.  Evidence for Service Bolstering 
 
Now that the Article has reviewed evidence for the DSM-5 revisions and 
related policy developments threatening access to services, outlining both the merits 
of this evidence and mitigating factors that lessen the negative impact of these 
changes, this section now turns to two overlooked benefits of the DSM-5 revisions 
for services access. Research and media commentary that claims the DSM-5 will 
endanger services have been reviewed, yet there were no studies found that point to 
possible benefits of the changes for access to services.108 Therefore, there are two 
factors that might help these children access services rather than block their access. 
These factors apply to children who previously had an Asperger’s or PDD-NOS 
diagnosis and who are able to obtain an autism diagnosis under the new criteria. 
Analyses that separate diagnosis loss by DSM-IV-TR subtype suggest that for PDD-
NOS, anywhere from 3% to 75% will retain a diagnosis under the DSM-5; for 
                                                     
106 See generally Andrews, supra note 100 (“The law may say that the mandate only 
applies to large group plans . . . .”). 
107 NOSS, supra note 74; DATA RES. CTR. FOR CHILD & ADOLESCENT HEALTH, supra 
note 104. 
108 See, e.g., Carey, supra note 3; Gann, supra note 5; Steenhuysen, supra note 6. 
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Asperger’s, anywhere from 4% to 83%.109 Furthermore, for the reasons outlined in 
the section above, we can assume that more children will retain a diagnosis than 
these studies predict because of repeated emphases on those with a DSM-IV-TR 
Asperger’s or PDD-NOS diagnosis receiving a DSM-5 diagnosis of autism for the 
purposes of service access. This section will show two overlooked benefits for this 
population that “switches” diagnoses from PDD-NOS or Asperger’s to autism. The 
claim in this section is not that these contributors to service access will necessarily 
outweigh the service endangerment contributors outlined previously, but instead that 
they are benefits of the DSM-5 changes to the autism category that need to be 
accounted for when analyzing DSM diagnosis-service entitlement links. 
 
1.  Reduced Insurance Ambiguity 
 
The first factor is reduced ambiguity about which types of autism are covered 
by a state’s private insurance mandates or EHBs. Table 3 outlines the definitions of 
which autistic disorders are covered by each state’s private insurance mandate. It 
shows that while many states explicitly define the mandate to cover autism, 
Asperger’s, and PDD-NOS, others offer more vague definitions that make it unclear 
whether Asperger’s is included in mandated intensive treatment coverage. For 
instance, New Hampshire and New Jersey’s legislation, which only specifies 
“pervasive developmental disorder or autism”110 or Vermont’s legislation, which 
includes autism spectrum disorders for coverage but does not clearly specify that 
Asperger’s should be covered.111 Because the DSM-5 changes will result in many of 
the children who once had an Asperger’s diagnostic label receiving an autism 
diagnosis, the changes can help clarify that this population is eligible for states’ 
mandated insurance benefits. 
 
2.  Increased Special Education Service Eligibility for Children Formerly 
Diagnosed with Asperger’s 
 
The second overlooked way through which the DSM changes could bolster, 
rather than undermine, access to services is by helping more children with 
Asperger’s qualify for the autism special education disability category. As 
discussed, the IDEA gives states the power to define their own special education 
criteria for each disability category as long as the criteria generally match or are 
more generous than the federal disability categories.112 The IDEA 2004 criteria 
defines the autism disability category as,  
 
                                                     
109 See Kulage et al., supra note 87, at 1923–25. 
110 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417-E:2 (Supp. 2014); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48E-
35.33 (West Supp. 2014). 
111 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4088(i) (Supp. 2014). 
112 See Pennington et al., supra note 93, at 2; see also MacFarlane & Kanaya, supra 
note 23, at 662–64 (“States, however, have the flexibility to create their own eligibility 
criteria as long as it meets or exceeds the minimal requirements . . . .”). 
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a developmental disability significantly affecting verbal and nonverbal 
communication and social interaction, generally evident before age three, 
that adversely affects a child’s educational performance. Other 
characteristics often associated with autism are engagement in repetitive 
activities and stereotyped movements, resistance to environmental change 
or change in daily routines, and unusual responses to sensory 
experiences.113 
 
This definition uses the general category of autism rather than specifying that 
children with other types of autistic disorders such as Asperger’s and PDD-NOS in 
the DSM-IV-TR are also included. MacFarlane and Kanaya, in a detailed analysis 
of each state’s special education criteria, find that this leeway granted to states leads 
to substantial variation in the criteria each uses for an autism diagnosis.114 Most 
relevant for understanding the DSM-5’s changes is that only twenty out of thirty-
one states (39.2%) explicitly include PDD-NOS or Asperger’s in their criteria, while 
the other 60.8% only explicitly mention autism. 
There is little data on whether and how children with Asperger’s or PDD-NOS 
living in the two sets of states—those that explicitly include the disorders in their 
state autism definition and those that do not—experience different levels of access 
to special education services or depths of service once deemed eligible.115 Yet, 
assuming that at least some children with Asperger’s and PDD-NOS living in states 
without their explicit inclusion either face difficulty qualifying for services under 
the autism category or qualify under a different category such as emotional 
disturbance that may lead to a less generous IEP, then the impact that the combined 
category has for children living in these states can be examined. Figure 3 combines 
the classification of states into those that include Asperger’s/PDD-NOS and those 
that do not with data on the proportion of children with autism in special education 
present in each of the fifty states (using 2010 data). It shows that a majority (57.2%) 
of children with Autism live in states whose special education criteria for the autism 
category does not explicitly include Asperger’s or PDD-NOS.  
 
                                                     
113 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(b)(1)(i) (2014). 
114  See generally MacFarlane & Kanaya, supra note 23, at 663–68 (“[I]nter-state 
variability has a more significant impact on ‘low incidence’ categories, such as Autism . . . 
.”). 
115 For instance, a child living in a non-Asperger’s included state having an IEP with 
less intensive services than a child living in an Asperger’s included state. 
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Figure 3. Proportion of Special Education Autism Population in Each Special 
Education Service Category116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Future research needs to analyze the evaluation step of DSM-5 changes more 
closely to investigate precisely how the new DSM-5 criteria are implemented. But, 
research indicates that the changes could help allow children previously diagnosed 
with Asperger’s or PDD-NOS to more easily qualify for the autism special education 
category, which in turn, could bolster the depth of IEP services. This is especially 
the case if there are clearer guidelines for what services are appropriate for those 
with autism, as compared to the services that are appropriate for those with 
emotional disturbance, other health impairments, or other categories under which 
they might have received special education services. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The present paper addressed the question: how will the DSM-5 revisions 
impact access to autism services? While media commentators posited a 
straightforward link between DSM-5 changes and service access, we should 
consider the different strength of couplings between a DSM diagnosis and 
entitlement access by investigating the factors that result in a diagnoses translation 
into service access. The Article began by outlining the pre DSM-5 policy 
                                                     
116  Figure was created by the author with data from two sources. See The 2012 
Statistical Abstract: Population, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compendia 
/statab/cats/population.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Y7AY-EZGL (last visited Mar. 12, 
2014); Historical State-Level IDEA Data Files, supra note 68. 
57.2%
42.8%
Children in states that
do not include
Asperger's/PDD-NOS
Children in states that
do include
Asperger's/PDD-NOS
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background for autism entitlements. This background helps contextualize the policy 
environment into which the DSM-5 changes entered. Rather than examining autism 
medical and educational services in isolation, we should conceive of these services 
as interdependent, and investigate how changes to the uptake or depth of medical 
service access affect changes to the uptake or depth of educational service access. 
Taking this interdependent perspective, the Article showed how the passage of 
private insurance mandates for autism services has led to more rapid uptake of 
special education services for autism, showing how one entitlement that creates a 
close DSM diagnosis-service link (an insurance mandate) increases uptake of 
another entitlement with a looser DSM diagnosis-service link (special education 
services). This shows that if DSM-5 revisions undermine access to medical 
entitlements there will be a corresponding impact on access to educational 
entitlements. 
But will the DSM-5 undermine access to entitlements? Part III addresses this 
question by reviewing the evidence for two ways that the DSM-5 and co-occurring 
policies may threaten service access. Part III also pointed to factors that might 
mitigate the extent of service loss as well as two overlooked benefits of the DSM-5 
revisions for service access. Future research should investigate how clinicians, 
advocacy groups, special education evaluation teams, and other stakeholders use the 
DSM-5 changes in practice and craft policies that are responsive to concerns 
introduced by the changes. For now, the autism case study is used to highlight the 
benefits of looking into the “black box” that often stands between a DSM diagnosis 
and service access, and correspondingly thinking about the link between DSM 
diagnoses and services in terms of tighter versus looser coupling between the 
diagnosis and treatment.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables 
 
  
                                                     
117 See NOSS, supra note 74. 
118 See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, supra note 77. 
119 See BUNCE & WIESKE, supra note 75, at 3. 
120 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 76. 
121 See MacFarlane & Kanaya, supra note 23, at 665–66. 
 Percent Mean  SD 
 
Presence of an autism insurance mandate 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Yes mandate 
 
58.8% 
 
-- 
 
 
 
No mandate 
 
41.2% 
 
-- 
 
 
 
Median income117 
 
-- 
 
$50,738.2 
 
$7,558 
 
Percent ERISA exemption118 
 
-- 
 
36.4% 
 
5.8 
 
Total number of state mandates119 
 
 
 
44.4% 
 
13.6 
 
Political affiliation120 
   
 
0–2 (Democrat) 
 
41.2% 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
3 (Independent) 
 
0% 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
4–6 (Republican) 
 
58.8% 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
Generosity of special education criteria121 
   
Not generous  
60.8% 
 
-- 
 
-- 
Generous  
39.2% 
 
-- 
 
-- 
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Table 2. Factors Predicting Utilization of Special Education Services for Autism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* denotes significance at the 5% level, ** denotes significance at the 1% level 
                                                     
122 See NOSS, supra note 74. 
123 See AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, supra note 77. 
124 See BUNCE & WIESKE, supra note 75, at 11–34. 
125 See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 76. 
126 See MacFarlane & Kanaya, supra note 23, at 665. 
 β 
 
Presence of an autism insurance mandate 
 
0.468** 
 
Median income122 
 
0.000 
 
Percent ERISA exemption123 
 
-6.280* 
 
Total number of state mandates124 
 
0.004 
 
Political affiliation125 
 
-0.121 
 
Generosity of special education criteria126 
 
0.210 
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Table 3. Definitions of Autism in Private Insurance Mandates 
State Regulation Language for autism definition 
Alaska 
ALASKA STAT. § 
21.42.397(g)(2) (2014) 
“‘[A]utism spectrum disorders’ 
means pervasive developmental 
disorders, or a group of conditions 
having substantially the same 
characteristics as pervasive 
developmental disorders, as 
defined in the American 
Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders-IV-TR, as 
amended or reissued from time to 
time[.]” 
Arizona 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 20-826.04(E)(1) 
(2010) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorder’ 
means one of the three following 
disorders as defined in the most 
recent edition of the diagnostic and 
statistical manual of mental 
disorders of the American 
psychiatric association: (a) Autistic 
disorder. (b) Asperger’s syndrome. 
(c) Pervasive developmental 
disorder—not otherwise 
specified.” 
Arkansas 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-
99-418(a)(3) (2014) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorder’ 
means any of the pervasive 
developmental disorders as defined 
by the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, including: 
(A) Autistic disorder; (B) 
Asperger’s disorder; and (C) 
Pervasive developmental disorder 
not otherwise specified[.]” 
California 
CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 
1374.73(D)(2) (West 
Supp. 2015) 
“‘Pervasive developmental 
disorder or autism’ shall have the 
same meaning and interpretation 
as used in Section 1374.72.” 
Colorado 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 
10-16-104(1.4)(III) 
(2014) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorders’ or 
‘ASD’ includes the following 
neurobiological disorders: Autistic 
disorder, Asperger’s disorder, and 
atypical autism as a diagnosis 
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within pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified, as 
defined in the most recent edition 
of the diagnostic and statistical 
manual of mental disorders, at the 
time of the diagnosis.” 
Connecticut 
CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 38a-514b (a)(3) 
(West Supp. 2014) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorder’ 
means a pervasive developmental 
disorder set forth in the most 
recent edition of the American 
Psychiatric Association’s 
‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders’, including, 
but not limited to, Autistic 
Disorder, Rett’s Disorder, 
Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, 
Asperger’s Disorder and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified.” 
Delaware 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
18, §3366(e)(3) (Supp. 
2014) 
“Autism spectrum disorders’ 
means any of the pervasive 
developmental disorders as defined 
by the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM), 
including Autistic Disorder, 
Asperger’s Disorder and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified, as such may 
be amended hereafter from time to 
time.” 
District of 
Columbia 
D.C. CODE § 31–
3271(2) (LexisNexis 
2001) 
“The term ‘congential or genetic 
birth defect’ includes: (A) Autism 
or an autism spectrum disorder[.]” 
Florida 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
627.6686(2)(b) (West 
Supp. 2015) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorder’ 
means any of the following 
disorders as defined in the most 
recent edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders of the American 
Psychiatric Association: 1. Autistic 
disorder. 2. Asperger’s syndrome. 
3. Pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified.” 
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Illinois 
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. § 5/356z.14(i) 
(West Supp. 2013) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorders’ 
means pervasive developmental 
disorders as defined in the most 
recent edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, including autism, 
Asperger’s disorder, and pervasive 
developmental disorder not 
otherwise specified.” 
Indiana 
IND. CODE ANN. § 27-
8-14.2-3 (West Supp. 
2014) 
“As used in this chapter, ‘autism 
spectrum disorder’ means a 
neurological condition, including 
Asperger’s syndrome and autism, 
as defined in the most recent 
edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders of the American 
Psychiatric Association.” 
Iowa 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 
514C.28(2)(c) (West 
Supp. 2014) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorders’ 
means any of the pervasive 
developmental disorders including 
autistic disorder, Asperger’s 
disorder, and pervasive 
developmental disorders not 
otherwise specified. The 
commissioner, by rule, shall define 
‘autism spectrum disorders’ 
consistent with definitions 
provided in the most recent edition 
of the American psychiatric 
association’s diagnostic and 
statistical manual of mental 
disorders, as such definitions may 
be amended from time to time. The 
commissioner may adopt the 
definitions provided in such 
manual by reference.” 
Kansas 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-
6524(b)(2) (Supp.2013) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorder’ 
means the following disorders 
within the autism spectrum: 
Autistic disorder, Asperger’s 
syndrome and pervasive 
developmental disorder not 
otherwise specified, as such terms 
are specified in the diagnostic and 
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statistical manual of mental 
disorders, fourth edition, text 
revision (DSM-IV-TR), of the 
American psychiatric association, 
as published in May, 2000, or later 
versions as established in rules and 
regulations adopted by the 
behavioral sciences regulatory 
board pursuant to K.S.A. 74-7507, 
and amendments thereto.”  
Kentucky 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
304.17A-141(3) 
(LexisNexis 2011) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorder’ 
means a physical, mental, or 
cognitive illness or disorder which 
includes any of the pervasive 
developmental disorders as defined 
by the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (‘DSM’) 
published by the American 
Psychiatric Association, including 
Autistic disorder, Asperger’s 
disorder, and Pervasive 
Developmental disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified.” 
Louisiana 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
22:1050(G)(3) (2009) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorders’ 
means any of the pervasive 
developmental disorders as defined 
by the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM), 
including Autistic Disorder, 
Asperger’s Disorder, and 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder 
Not Otherwise Specified.” 
Maine 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 24–A, § 2768(1)(B) 
(Supp. 2014) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorders’ 
means any of the pervasive 
developmental disorders as defined 
by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th 
edition, published by the American 
Psychiatric Association, including 
autistic disorder, Asperger’s 
disorder and pervasive 
developmental disorder not 
otherwise specified.” 
2015] AUTISM SERVICE ACCESS 841 
Maryland 
S.B. 694, 2014 Leg., 
434th Sess. § 17-6A-
01(2) (Md. 2014) Autism spectrum disorder. 
Massachusetts 
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. 
ch. 32A, § 25(a) (West 
2011) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorders’, any 
of the pervasive developmental 
disorders as defined by the most 
recent edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, including autistic 
disorder, Asperger’s disorder and 
pervasive developmental disorders 
not otherwise specified.” 
Michigan 
Mich. Comp. Laws 
Ann. § 550.1416e(6)(c) 
(West Supp. 2014) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorders’ 
means any of the following 
pervasive developmental disorders 
as defined by the diagnostic and 
statistical manual: (i) Autistic 
disorder. (ii) Asperger’s disorder. 
(iii) Pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified.” 
Minnesota 
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 
62A.3094(b) (West 
Supp. 2015) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorders’ 
means the conditions as 
determined by criteria set forth in 
the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders of the 
American Psychiatric 
Association.” 
Missouri 
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 
376.1224.1(3) (West 
2013) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorders’, a 
neurobiological disorder, an illness 
of the nervous system, which 
includes Autistic Disorder, 
Asperger’s Disorder, Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified, Rett’s 
Disorder, and Childhood 
Disintegrative Disorder, as defined 
in the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders of the 
American Psychiatric 
Association[.]” 
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Montana 
Mont. Code Ann. § 33-
22-515(2) (2013) 
“Coverage under this section must 
be provided to a child who is 
diagnosed with one of the 
following disorders as defined by 
the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manuel 
of Mental Disorders: (a) autistic 
disorder; (b) Asperger’s disorder; 
or (c) pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified.” 
Nebraska 
Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
44-7,106(1)(b) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 
2014) 
“Autism spectrum disorder means 
any of the pervasive 
developmental disorders or autism 
spectrum disorder as defined by 
the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, as 
the most recent edition of such 
manual existed on July 18, 
2014[.]” 
Nevada 
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
689A.0435(7)(b) 
(Lexis-Nexis 2014) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorders’ 
means a neurobiological medical 
condition including, without 
limitation, autistic disorder, 
Asperger’s Disorder and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified.” 
New Hampshire 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
417-E:2 (Supp. 2014) 
“Coverage for Treatment of 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder 
or Autism.” 
New Jersey 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
17:48E-35.33(a) (West 
Supp. 2014) 
“The health service corporation 
shall provide coverage for 
expenses incurred in screening and 
diagnosing autism or another 
developmental disability.” 
New 
Mexico 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59A-
22-49(H)(1) (Supp. 
2014) 
“‘[A]utism spectrum disorder’ 
means a condition that meets the 
diagnostic criteria for the 
pervasive developmental disorders 
published in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, fourth edition, text 
revision, also known as DSM-IV-
TR, published by the American 
psychiatric association, including 
autistic disorder; Asperger’s 
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disorder; pervasive development 
disorder not otherwise specified; 
Rett’s disorder; and childhood 
disintegrative disorder[.]” 
New York 
N.Y. Ins. Law § 
3216(C)(i) (McKinney 
Supp. 2015) 
“‘[A]utism  spectrum disorder’ 
means any pervasive 
developmental disorder as defined 
in the most recent edition of the 
diagnostic and  statistical manual 
of mental disorders, including 
autistic disorder, Asperger’s 
disorder, Rett’s disorder, 
childhood disintegrative disorder, 
or pervasive developmental 
disorder not otherwise specified 
(PDD-NOS).” 
Oregon 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 
743A.190(3)(b) (2013) 
“‘Pervasive developmental 
disorder’ means a neurological 
condition that includes Asperger’s 
syndrome, autism, developmental 
delay, developmental disability or 
mental retardation.” 
Pennsylvania 
40 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 764h(f)(3) (West 
2014) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorders’ 
means any of the pervasive 
developmental disorders defined 
by the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM), or its 
successor, including autistic 
disorder, Asperger’s disorder and 
pervasive developmental disorder 
not otherwise specified.” 
Rhode Island 
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 
27-20.11-2(2) (West 
Supp. 2014) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorders’ 
means any of the pervasive 
developmental disorders as defined 
by the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM) 
published by the American 
Psychiatric Association.” 
South Carolina 
S.C. Code Ann. § 38-
71-280(A)(1) (Supp. 
2013) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorder’ 
means one of the three following 
disorders as defined in the most 
recent edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental 
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Disorders of the American 
Psychiatric Association: (a) 
Autistic Disorder; (b) Asperger’s 
Syndrome; (c) Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder—Not 
Otherwise Specified.” 
Texas 
Tex. Ins. Code Ann. § 
1355.001(3) (West 
2009) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorder’ 
means a neurobiological disorder 
that includes autism, Asperger’s 
syndrome, or Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder—Not 
Otherwise Specified.” 
Utah 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-
22-642(1)(b) (West 
Supp. 2014) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorder’ 
means pervasive developmental 
disorders as defined by the most 
recent edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM).” 
Vermont 
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 
4088i(f)(2),  (5) (Supp. 
2014) 
“(2) ‘Autism spectrum disorders’ 
means one or more pervasive 
developmental disorders as defined 
in the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manuel 
of Mental Disorders, including 
autistic disorder, pervasive 
developmental disorder not 
otherwise specified, and 
Asperger’s disorder.”  
“(5) ‘Early childhood 
developmental disorder’ means a 
childhood mental or physical 
impairment or combination of 
mental and physical impairments 
that results in functional 
limitations in major life activities, 
accompanied by a diagnosis 
defined by the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) or the 
International Classification of 
Disease (ICD). The term includes 
autism spectrum disorders, but 
does not include a learning 
disability.” 
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Virginia 
Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-
3418.17(B) (2014) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorder’ 
means any pervasive 
developmental disorder, including 
(i) autistic disorder, (ii) Asperger’s 
Syndrome, (iii) Rett syndrome, 
(iv) childhood disintegrative 
disorder, or (v) Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder—Not 
Otherwise Specified, as defined in 
the most recent edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders of the 
American Psychiatric 
Association.” 
West Virginia 
W.Va. Code Ann. §§ 5-
16B-6e(e)(2) 
(LexisNexis Supp. 
2013) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorder’ 
means any pervasive 
developmental disorder, including 
autistic disorder, Asperger’s 
Syndrome, Rett syndrome, 
childhood disintegrative disorder, 
or Pervasive Development 
Disorder as defined in the most 
recent edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders of the American 
Psychiatric Association.” 
Wisconsin 
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
632.895(12m)(a)(1) 
(West 2014) 
“‘Autism spectrum disorder’ 
means any of the following: a. 
Autism disorder. b. Asperger’s 
syndrome. c. Pervasive 
developmental disorder not 
otherwise specified.” 
